Kaplan, Stalnaker and Wettstein all urge a two-stage theory of language whereon the propositions expressed by sentences are generated prior to being evaluated. A new ambiguity for sentences emerges, propositional rather syntactic or semantic. Kaplan and Wettstein then propose to explain Donnellan's referential/attributive ambiguity as simply being two-stage propositional ambiguity. This is tacitly seen as further confirmation for two-stage theory. Modal ambiguities are prime motivators for two-stage theory which distinguishes local from exotic evaluation to explain them. But if sentences can (...) be found which exhibit both modal and referential/attribute ambiguity, an apparent paradox arises for a two-stage account. The theory recognizes both singular and general propositions, in Kaplan's senses. But reflecting one sense of such a doubly ambiguous sentence, two-stage theory would seem to need a proposition both singular and general with respect to a definite description attributively used. Since modal operators will come into rendering the problem sentences, an obvious idea is to let scope distinctions rescue two-stage theory from the apparent paradox. But while a rescue based on multiple renderings is proposed, it is not strictly a scope rescue, though different scopes are involved. Readers are asked to trust the author on missing formalities of an intuitively transparent two-sorted modal language that is employed. Two-stage theorists explicitly oppose scope treatments of modal ambiguities seeing them as rivals. Stalnaker, in particular, argues against them. But his arguments are shown not to count against the proposed rescue, on which the anticipated rivalry proves to be minimal. (shrink)

Still, some may still want to say it. If so, my replies may gain nothing better than a stalemate against such persistence, though I can hope that earlier revelations will discourage others from persisting. But two replies are possible. Both come down, one circuitously, to an issue with us from the beginning: whether the language of the right side of (10) is suspect. For if (10) is to support instances for (6) which are about objects, that clause must itself be (...) about objects. (These would be ones assigned by variants of I it mentions to constants it mentions.) Yet Barwise and I would call it implicitly about functions. Ironically, the discussion surrounding (10), hoping to settle that issue, could only do so if the issue were already settled, revealing decisively the ontology of (10). If irritating, this is also inevitable, given the Tarskian spirit of the ensivioned semantics for QLB.A second reply begins by noting that a QLB semantics which implies (10) cannot simply be assumed. Even a QL semantics augmented to imply (11) is not trivial to frame, as I will let readers confirm. On the QLB project, Barwise comments thus:It is not possible to explain the meaning of an essential use of branching quantification ... inductively, by treating one quantifier at a time in a first-order fashion. Some use of higher-type abstract objects is essential. (BQE75)But believers in a modest ontology for QLB can claim a non sequitur here. For (10), as they read it, succeeds without mentioning abstract objects, though not in the “one quantifier at a time” way which Barwise rightly finds impossible. This is not yet to say the same about a QLB semantics implying (10). But that too can be said, as it happens, with as good a conscience as with (10). A suitable treatment can begin by somehow linearizing non QL sentences like (6). Still assuming prefixes whose rows each consist, speaking loosely, of n universal quantifiers followed by a single existential, we could simply line up these rows in any order, with unique deconcatenatability being assured. From then on, it gets both tedious and complex. A full syntax is essential, and some surprising categories arose in mine. I will spare readers all details, except to say that one can indeed “treat one quantifier at a time”, if not “in first-order fashion”: schematic rules for treating n quantifiers at once can be eschewed. Unsurprisingly, heavy use is made of the “depending only on” idiom seen in (10). Nor does it surprise me that this semantics can succeed, with that idiom available. Roughly, if open talk about functions works in a semantics for QLF, what I read as implicit talk about them should work in a semantics for QLB See [6] for a start on a semantics aspiring to handle sentences like (6) without invoking abstract objects. See also my comments on its notion of dependence, in [9]. . So even from a bare sketch, we can see that this new semantics settles nothing. It just leads back to the stalemate. Barwise and I will read crucial clauses as talking implicitly about functions, but this general charge against an idiom is equally deniable wherever the idiom occurs: in a reading for (6), say, or in the metalanguage can hardly repress a motherhood slogan: better dead than obscurely read. But that just denies the denial, unhelpfully. A better comment is the reminder that the claim stays alive only in a form which no one has ever imagined for it. The QLB quantifiers that cannot be shown not to range over objects are not the items anyone would ever have pointed to in illustrating the unkillable claim. (shrink)

This book is both shorter and more comprehensive than any of Quine's other six since Word and Object. But let this description raise no fears that it must stretch itself too thin, at least for veteran students of his major philosophical project, “to examine the evidential support of science”. For with less detail in focus, the structural elements of that project stand revealed as never before. Improvements in presentation, as Quine sees them, help here. And veterans can learn of certain (...) changes, notable if not huge, in various Quinean views. For besides summing up and explaining, Pursuit of Truth moves on. (shrink)

Strawson has recently developed a style of semantic subject-predicate analysis which, applied to certain sentences, rivals a standard account that turns on the notion of scope. His account depends on three notions: (i) complex, derivative properties, (ii) predicate-negation, and (iii) substantiation—an alleged semantic function having particular-specification as a special case. As I further develop it, the suspicion energes that his account simply is the scope account in disguise. I show that it is rather an untenable rival, placing the blame on (...) his notion (iii), vindicating his notion (i) and finding his notion (ii) theoretically needless. (shrink)

Big Ideas for Little Kids includes everything a teacher, a parent, or a college student needs to teach philosophy to elementary school children from picture books. Written in a clear and accessible style, the book explains why it is important to allow young children access to philosophy during primary-school education. Wartenberg also gives advice on how to construct a "learner-centered" classroom, in which children discuss philosophical issues with one another as they respond to open-ended questions by saying whether they agree (...) or disagree with what others have said. (shrink)

Thomas Hill, a leading figure in the recent development of Kantian moral philosophy, presents a set of essays exploring the implications of basic Kantian ideas for practical issues. The first part of the book provides background in central themes in Kant's ethics; the second part discusses questions regarding human welfare; the third focuses on moral worth-the nature and grounds of moral assessment of persons as deserving esteem or blame. Hill shows moral, political, and social philosophers just how valuable moral (...) theory can be in addressing practical matters. (shrink)

Respect, Pluralism, and Justice is a series of essays which sketches a broadly Kantian framework for moral deliberation, and then uses it to address important social and political issues. Hill shows how Kantian theory can be developed to deal with questions about cultural diversity, punishment, political violence, responsibility for the consequences of wrongdoing, and state coercion in a pluralistic society.

This stimulating collection of essays in ethics eschews the simple exposition and refinement of abstract theories. Rather, the author focuses on everyday moral issues, often neglected by philosophers, and explores the deeper theoretical questions which they raise. Such issues are: Is it wrong to tell a lie to protect someone from a painful truth? Should one commit a lesser evil to prevent another from doing something worse? Can one be both autonomous and compassionate? Other topics discussed are servility, weakness of (...) will, suicide, obligations to oneself, snobbery, and environmental concerns. A feature of the collection is the contrast of Kantian and utilitarian answers to these problems. The essays are crisply and lucidly written and will appeal to both teachers and students of philosophy. (shrink)

THE NATURE OF ART is a collection of 29 seminal, historically-organized readings that are focused on a basic philosophical question: What is Art? Including writings from the Western tradition'both Continental and Analytic traditions'as well as non-Western, minority, and feminist writings, this volume provides students with a rich set of resources to explore this matter both broadly and deeply. Introductions to each reading situate the selection amidst each respective thinker's body of work and the greater philosophical context in which the remarks (...) arose. Reading questions accompany each selection, drawing students' attention to key points to be encountered. Hailed by reviewers and adopters for its clarity and rigor, Wartenberg's THE NATURE OF ART offers a lively and engaging introduction to the philosophy of art. (shrink)

Re-analysis of the data provided in the target article reveals a lack of evidence for a strong, universal relationship between parasite stress and the variables relating to sociality. Furthermore, even if associations between these variables do exist, the analyses presented here do not provide evidence for Fincher & Thornhill's (F&T's) proposed causal mechanism.

Examines how the educations of America's first four presidents, and in particular their scholarly devotion to ancient Greek and Roman classics, informed the beliefs and ideals that shaped the nation's constitution and government.

In this book Thomas Wren uncovers and assesses the largely hidden philosophical assumptions about human motivation that have shaped contemporary psychological ...

This chapter talks about Peter Catalanotto's delightfully illustrated picture book, Emily's Art. Traditionally, the philosophy of art was also called aesthetics, a term derived from the ancient Greek. There are many intriguing issues in the philosophy of art. For example, philosophers have proposed various different solutions to the question of what art is. Art is a subject that interests children because they often are engaged in producing it. So an interesting way to begin a discussion of issues in the philosophy (...) of art is to ask the children whether they prefer Kelly's paintings or Emily's and why. Once they explain, ask them whether they think that other people should agree with them, or if it's fine for other people to disagree. And, as usual, ask them to explain why they think what they think. (shrink)

Leo Lionni's charming tale of a mouse, eponymously named Frederick, raises very important questions about the nature of work, a topic addressed in the field of social and political philosophy. A question — one that the mice themselves raise — is whether Frederick is doing work when he gathers the sun, colors, and words. Since the book has used the word “gather” as its way of conceptualizing work, it might seem that Frederick is working, for he, too, is also gathering (...) things, just not the things that all the other mice do. Alternatively, we can say that even though Frederick is doing intellectual, rather than physical work, both types of work are necessary for the continued existence of anything but the most simple society. Children have differing opinions about whether Frederick was working or was just being a slacker. (shrink)

This chapter talks about a picture of Crockett Johnson's book, Harold and the Purple Crayon, where Harold, a young toddler, standing with his body facing to our left but with his head turned slightly to the right. When we see Harold making a drawing with his purple crayon in an illustration by Crocker Johnson, we are witnessing the workings of Harold's imagination. Because of the peculiar metaphysics of his world, objects solve his problems when they morph from drawings into real (...) things. Harold and the Purple Crayon is a testament to the power of children's imaginations, their ability to give reality to things we adults can only dream about. The book gives us an introduction to the metaphysical distinction between real and merely imaginary things, and even criticizes one attempt to develop an account of that distinction. (shrink)

This chapter highlights different ways in which people communicate with one another. Although language is clearly a crucial means of communication, there are many other things that we can do to convey a message to someone. The chapter presents a story of in which Trixie had difficulty communicating to her father that they had left Knuffle Bunny at the Laundromat. Philosophers from earlier centuries would have viewed Trixie's difficulty as stemming from her attaching the wrong sounds (words?) to the ideas (...) she had in her mind. Twentieth‐century philosophers found this view unconvincing. The philosophy of mind investigates questions about the nature of the human mind. Although many different issues are addressed in this area of philosophy, the one that traditionally took pride of place was that of articulating the difference between the mind and the body, and deciding whether either was more basic than the other. (shrink)

This chapter talks about Tony Fucile's amusing book, Let's Do Nothing!. This book straddles the boundary between metaphysics and the philosophy of language, for the concept of nothing has been a very puzzling one to philosophers. But before entering those murky waters, let's see how Sal and Frankie fare in their attempt to do nothing. Sal and Frankie were trapped in their own fly bottle when they tried to do nothing. Sal's discovery — that you can't do nothing — was (...) a philosophical discovery, one that freed him and Frankie from the type of bewitchment that Wittgenstein and other ordinary language philosophers saw embodied in the history of philosophy. Discussion of “Nothing” with children is started by asking the children what are some examples of things that they really like to do. (shrink)

The theory of knowledge attempts to explain the nature and extent of human knowledge. A good place to begin the discussion on this theory is with the Princess Lenore's beliefs about the moon in Many Moons, a children's story on the different conceptions of knowledge. The story raises important questions about the nature of knowledge and those who claim to have it. We can understand the philosophical point that Many Moons makes about knowledge ask why the Jester is able to (...) solve a problem that none of the King's advisors can. An objectivist sees knowledge as something that is independent of any individual's point of view. The Jester has a different conception of knowledge. There are many other issues in the theory of knowledge besides skepticism and relativism. (shrink)

Harry Allard's very engaging and popular picture book Miss Nelson Is Missing! raises an important ethical issue. The issue is whether it is morally permissible to adopt an immoral means if doing so promotes a morally good end. The book shows us how successful deceptive behavior can be and also provides with an opportunity for reflecting on why such behavior is morally wrong. So there is a lesson to be learned about the importance of approaching children's picture books armed with (...) philosophy. If a parent just reads Miss Nelson Is Missing! to a child without raising the issue of whether what Miss Nelson did was moral, the child might come away thinking that her parent approved of Miss Nelson's actions. And, if the child took this to heart, she might think that it was all right to deceive others so long as one did so for their own benefit. (shrink)

People could have mistaken beliefs that they arrive at by faulty reasoning. B.Wiseman's delightful book, Morris the Moose, takes a more detailed look at such reasoning, itself the subject of philosophical logic. Morris explains to the cow why she must be a moose. He draws a false conclusion from true premises: that the cow has four legs, a tail, and horns. His problem could have been remedied by paying more attention to logic. Morris appeals to something like the following principle: (...) Things that look different from each other are really different from each other. The real lesson can take from this story of this stubborn moose is that it can sometimes be hard to admit your mistakes. Our own beliefs have a tenacity that makes it hard to accept contradictory evidence, and we are not always open to finding the truth if it challenges our cherished beliefs. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Arnold Lobel's story “Cookies,” a story about will‐power, a concept central to moral psychology. The question of whether Frog and Toad both, or one or neither, possess will‐power at the end of the story is a good one to begin a discussion of this interesting philosophical topic with children. The concept of will‐power is linked to an important philosophical concept, weakness of the will. The Greek philosopher Aristotle first identified this phenomenon. This area of philosophical investigation bridges (...) the fields of ethics and philosophy of mind, developing an account of the mental faculties necessary for moral — and immoral — behavior. Moral psychology integrates ethics with the philosophy of mind. While ethics discusses questions of right and wrong, moral psychology focuses on what gives us the ability to do what's right despite the attractions of morally problematic courses of action. (shrink)

Shrek! focuses on an issue in the philosophy of language, a relatively new area of philosophical investigation that first emerged during the twentieth century. Some philosophers disagree with the claim that you cannot separate the descriptive and evaluative elements of linguistic statements. This is because they take descriptive statements to be the basic elements of language, to which our subjective attitudes get attached later in a contingent manner. At its most basic level language presents a symbolic picture of facts in (...) the world. Shrek! presents what philosophers call a thought experiment that purports to show that the descriptive and evaluative contents of sentences are really distinct. The chapter ends by suggesting how to discuss the philosophy of language with children. (shrink)

In Daniel Manus Pinkwater's quirkily illustrated book, The Big Orange Splot, a strange accident leads a man to change his life. The book presents an important claim that the existentialists and other philosophers have embraced: That the life of conformity is one that people ought to avoid, despite its attractiveness. Instead of living a life just like everyone else and fulfilling expectations that others have for us, our lives should resemble the transformed facades of all the homes on Mr. Plumbean's (...) street: reflections of our own, individual dreams. (shrink)

The chapter talks about Shel Silverstein's The Giving Tree, which is a favorite of many children, adults, and teachers. The story of a relationship between a boy and a tree is charming for, despite the vicissitudes of the relationship, the two end up together at the end, with the boy — now an old man — sitting contentedly on the tree — itself reduced to a mere stump. The book raises an important issue in the field of environmental ethics. It (...) asks us to recognize that between childhood and old age, people operating within the Western tradition of ethics are not mindful of the value that the non‐human beings in their environment have for them as well as for future generations. Harkening to such warnings, environmental ethicists have attempted to raise important issues about our relationship with the other beings that make up our world. (shrink)

Margaret Wise Brown's The Important Book, which is a childrens' picture book, provides an excellent opportunity to discuss metaphysics. The book opens up for our reflection the viability of a certain metaphysical account of the nature of objects. In making a distinction between the important feature or property of an object and all the others that it simply is or has, The Important Book operates with the assumption that all objects have what metaphysicians call an essential property. As the book (...) has it, while there are many things that are true of any object, only one is essential to it. These other things are accidents or non‐essential properties of the object. Essentialism is the metaphysical view that objects have one property — their essential property — that cannot change while the object remains the same thing. (shrink)